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Notes
Horizontal Mergers, Competitors, and Antitrust
Standing Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act:
Fruitless Searches For Antitrust Injury
INTRODUCTION
Two competing oligopolists,' 01 and 02, propose an agreement whereby 01 will acquire the assets of 02. Another competitor, C, files an antitrust suit against 01, alleging that the
proposed horizontal merger 2 would violate section 7 of the
Clayton Act3 by decreasing competition through increasing
market concentration. C seeks to enjoin the merger under section 16 of the Clayton Act.4 Before 1984 no federal court
1.

An oligopolist is one of a small number of firms in a highly concen-

trated market. See H. HOVENKAmP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw
§ 4.2, at 92 (1985).
2. "A horizontal merger occurs when one firm acquires another firm
that manufactures the same product or a close substitute, and both firms operate in the same geographic market." H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 11.1, at
293.
3. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce, where ...

the effect of such acquisition may be

substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Before 1980, § 7 applied only to corporations. H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 11.1, at 293. "Person" now is defined to include
"corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of
either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any
State, or the laws of any foreign country." 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1982).
4. Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to
sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States
having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage
by a violation of the antitrust laws ...when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct
that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity ....
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
In seeking to enjoin the merger under § 16 of the Clayton Act, C alleges
that the postmerger firm would abuse its increased market power and engage
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squarely faced the issue raised by C's antitrust claim. Four recent federal decisions, however, illustrate the primary concern
raised when a competitor seeks to enjoin another competitor's
horizontal merger or joint venture with a third competitor:
that such a competitor may attempt to use the procompetitive
antitrust laws to accomplish anticompetitive ends. Despite this
concern, the courts in Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co.,5 Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill,
Inc.,6 and White Consolidated Industries v. Whirlpool Corp.,7
determined that the plaintiff-competitor in each instance had
standing to enjoin a merger between two competitors. In a similar case involving a proposed joint venture, the District Court
for the District of Columbia in Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp.8 held that a major automobile manufacturer had
standing to seek an injunction to block a joint venture between
two other major automobile manufacturers.
This Note examines the wisdom of granting antitrust
standing to a competitor who seeks to enjoin a proposed horizontal merger or joint venture between two other competitors.
Part I describes the applicable provisions of the Clayton Act
and the development of standing requirements in private actions for both damage awards and injunctions to enforce the
Clayton Act provisions. Part II analyzes the courts' determinations of standing to seek an injunction in the recent horizontal
merger and joint venture situations. The Note concludes that
courts should not grant standing to competitors who seek to enjoin other competitors' horizontal mergers or joint ventures because such competitors cannot allege a plausible theory of
antitrust injury.
in predatory pricing behavior to drive C from the market. See infra notes 7475 and accompanying text. In response, the newly-merged defendant argues
that if C suffers from the merger it would only suffer from the effects of increased competition and therefore can allege no "antitrust injury" nor have
standing to enforce the antitrust laws. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying
text.
5. 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985); see infra
note 69 and accompanying text.
6. 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986) (No.
85-473); see infra note 62 and accompanying text.
7. 612 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ohio), injunction vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022
(N.D. Ohio 1985); see infra note 83 and accompanying text.
8. 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984); see infra note 93 and accompanying
text.
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ANTITRUST STANDING
THE CLAYTON ACT AND ANTITRUST STANDING

Section 7 of the Clayton Act is a prophylactic measure intended to arrest feared consequences of intercorporate relationships before those relationships can work their evil.9 As
amended in 1950,10 it proscribes mergers which may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly.1 1 The amended
section 7 was intended to protect small businesses from larger,
more efficient competitors in concentrated industries, even if
such protection meant higher prices for consumers.12 This con9. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485
(1977). For the facts and a detailed discussion of Brunswick, see infra notes
31-40 and accompanying text.
10. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), amended by CellerKefauver Antimerger Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1982)). The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 to augment the already-existing Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (currently codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1982)). See 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 303, at 4-5 (1978). The Clayton Act originally proscribed mergers by stock acquisition where the effect would be to substantially
lessen competition. Id. The Act did not, however, bar the acquisition by one
corporation of the assets of another. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 313 (1962). Through the 1950 amendments, Congress wished to plug
this loophole. See id. For a thorough discussion of the legislative goals behind
the 1950 amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act, see id. at 311-323.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
12. Senator Estes Kefauver, a co-sponsor of the 1950 amendment, characterized the mood of the Congress:
The present trend of great corporations to increase their economic
power is the antithesis of meritorious competitive development. It is
no accident that we now have a big Government, big labor unions, and
big business. The concentration of great economic power in a few corporations necessarily leads to the formation of large Nation-wide unions.... Local economic independence cannot be preserved in the
face of consolidations such as we have had during the past few years.
The control of American business is steadily being transferred ...
from local communities to a few large cities in which central managers decide the policies and the fate of the far-flung enterprises they
control. Millions of people depend helplessly on their judgment.
Through monopolistic mergers the people are losing power to direct
their own economic welfare.
96 CONG. REC. 16,452 (1950). Representative Emanuel Celler, another co-sponsor of the amendment, expressed his fears by reading from a report filed with
a former Secretary of War on the history of industrial concentration in Germany: "Germany under the Nazi set-up built up a great series of industrial
monopolies in steel, rubber, coal, and other materials. The monopolies soon
got control of Germany, brought Hitler to power and forced virtually the
whole world into war." 95 CONG. REC. 11,486 (1949).
One commentator has concluded that the amendment was passed on the
basis of five fundamental assertions: that concentration of industry had
reached very high levels in America, that this concentration was still increasing, that mergers traditionally played an important role in the process of concentration, that the country was experiencing a new wave of mergers in which
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demnation of efficiency for the benefit of small businesses may
now be obsolete, however, in light of the Supreme Court's
statement in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.13 that
the purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect competition, not
competitors. 14 Brunswick represents a shift in the Court's approach toward the antitrust laws.15 The Court currently embig firms were swallowing little businesses, and that § 7, as originally enacted,
was defective because it allowed for acquisition through the purchase of assets.
Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARv. L. REV. 226, 234-35 (1960). Bok further noted:
[T]he curious aspect of the debates is the paucity of remarks having to
do with the effects of concentration on prices, innovation, distribution,
and efficiency. To be sure, there were allusions to the need for preserving competition. But competition appeared to possess a strong
socio-political connotation which centered on the virtues of the small
entrepreneur to an extent seldom duplicated in economic literature.
Id. at 236-37. For a discussion of the legislative intent underlying the 1950
amendments to the Clayton Act, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 315 (1962) (A "fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic
concentration in the American economy" sparked the enactment of § 7.); see
also H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 2.4, at 51 ("Congress was concerned
chiefly with protecting small businesses from larger competitors who faced
lower costs, even though the result of such protection would be lower total
output and higher consumer prices."). For a discussion of efficiency and other
sociopolitical goals as proper or improper goals of the antitrust laws, see infra
note 14. For a discussion of the trend in the courts toward more efficiencyoriented antitrust policy at the expense of small businesses, see infra note 14;
notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
13. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
14. Id. at 488. Under Brunswick, private plaintiffs, including small businesses, must allege "antitrust injury" before obtaining standing to enforce the
antitrust laws. Id. at 489. The Supreme Court in Brunswick denied standing
to a small business that complained merely of increased competition based
upon the greater efficiency of a competitor. The ruling indicates that economic efficiency and consumer welfare now outweigh the protection of small
business as a goal of the antitrust laws. See Reiter v. Sonotone, Inc., 430 U.S.
330, 342-43 (1979); Note, Vertical Refusals to Deal Under the Sherman Act"
Products Liability and Malley-Duff Divide the Circuits,69 MINN. L. REv. 1355,
1372 (1985); infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
15. One commentator has observed that
[i]n the 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court applied the merger
law to prevent increasing concentration of business assets into the
hands of fewer competitors. Competition was defined by the Court as
a process that required numerous participants and decentralization.
Competition was equated by the Court with deconcentration; and increasing concentration, by definition, lessened competition because it
removed an independent source of competitive effort. Applying the
merger law to prevent concentration, the Court protected competition
as the Court defined it and as the legislature had viewed it....
Beginning in 1974, the first year of the Burger Court's antitrust
majority, antitrust law shifted course. In a 1977 opinion, the Supreme
Court said that market impact must control antitrust decisions. Market impact was assessed in terms of efficiency. In addition, majority
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phasizes greater economic efficiency within the marketplace on
and political facthe theory that consumers will benefit; social
16
tors have become secondary considerations.
Two remedial provisions of the Clayton Act enable a private litigant to obtain relief from a section 7 violation. Section
4, which awards treble damages to anyone injured in business
or property as a result of an antitrust violation, 17 serves both
remedial and punitive roles. 8 Section 16 provides for injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage from a violation of
the antitrust laws.' 9
A.

SECTION 4 STANDING AND THE ANTITRUST INJURY
CONCEPT

Because the wording of section 4 allows for a potentially
large pool of injured parties, 20 courts developed prudential
opinions by some members of the Court began to reveal a strong undercurrent that business should be left presumptively free to do what
it wishes, apparently on the theory that business freedom tends to
maximize efficiency or on the theory that greater private business
freedom is crucial to a free society. Whereas the word "power" dominated Warren Court antitrust opinions, the words "efficiency" and
"market impact" have prominence in Burger Court antitrust opinions.
Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust. A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 1140, 1151-52 (1981).
16. In the midst of this Supreme Court shift to a more efficiency-oriented
antitrust policy, legal scholars have vigorously debated whether efficiency and
consumer welfare should be the sole policy guide to the application of the antitrust laws or whether other considerations, often social and political, should
also be considered. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 2.1, at 41-42. Two general schools of thought have emerged in the debate; the "Chicago School" taking the former position and the "Harvard School" the latter. For the classic
Chicago School statements, see R. BORK,THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); Posner, The ChicagoSchool ofAntitrustAnalysis,
127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979). For views in line with the Harvard School position, see Fox, supra note 15, at 1146-55; Hovenkamp, DistributiveJustice and
the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEo. WASH.L. REV. 1, 24-26 (1982); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979). For a critical discussion of the philosophical differences between the two schools, see L. SULLIvAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTTRUST, § 1, at 2-7 (1977); Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 1214 (1975).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
18. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 485. For a discussion of the punitive characteristics of § 4 and its proper application in that context, see 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 10, %311, at 32-36.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982). The appropriateness of injunctive relief is measured by traditional equity standards. Id.
20. A literal application of § 4 would appear to confer a right to treble
damages on any plaintiff who could establish that defendant's antitrust violation caused damage to his business or property. See Berger & Bernstein, An
Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 810 (1977);
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standing requirements to favor and disfavor groups of plaintiffs.2 1 Courts justified imposing such standing requirements to
prevent duplicative or windfall recoveries by plaintiffs, 22 to
avoid the financial ruination of defendants, 23 and to ease the
administrative burden of enforcing the antitrust laws.24 The
traditional tests used by the circuits to determine standing
under section 4 are the "direct injury" test, 25 the "target area"
28
test, 26 the "zone of interests" test,27 and the balancing test.
Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Determinationof StandingIn Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 AM.
U.L. REV. 795, 796-97 (1976). As one commentator notes, § 4 "appears to give a
cause of action to every person who is financially injured by a cartel or
overcharging monopolist." H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 14.1, at 356.
21. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 14.3, at 361. There is a wealth of material on the subject of standing to seek treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act. See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supranote 10, 1 333-335, at
160-76; H. HOVENKAmP, supra note 1, §§ 14.2-14.5, at 356-76; L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 16, § 247, at 772; Susman, Standing in Private Antitrust Cases:
Where is the Supreme Court Going?, 52 ANTrRUST L.J. 465 (1983); Note, Antitrust Injury and Standing: A Quest for Legal Cause, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1011
(1983) [hereinafter cited as MINNESOTA NOTE]; Note, Private Antitrust Standing: A Survey and Analysis of the Law After Associated Genera4 61 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1069 (1984).
22. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972) (duplicative recoveries); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp.
907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956) (windfall recoveries).
23. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975). In
Jeffrey, a group of residential phone subscribers sued for both damages and an
injunction against defendant's alleged anticompetitive acts. In denying standing, the Fifth Circuit recognized a need to prevent "potentially disastrous recoveries by those only tenuously hurt." Id. at 1131; see also Harrison v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (noting that § 4
should not be construed to yield unreasonable results and that "obviously,
there must be a limit somewhere"), affd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 828 (1954).
24. See e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In illinois
Brick, the State of Illinois and 700 local government entities sued defendants
for an alleged price fixing conspiracy. In affirming the denial of standing, the
Court was unwilling to carry the compensation principle to its logical extreme
by attempting to allocate damages among all possible plaintiffs within the defendants' chain of distribution. The court noted it was impossible to determine
the number of indirect purchasers and their respective damages. Id. at 746-47.
25. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). In
Loeb, the Third Circuit denied standing to a stockholder of a corporation who
alleged injury because of defendant's monopolization of the photographic industry. The court held that the alleged injury was only an indirect consequence of the violation. Id. at 709. Courts using this test have similarly denied
standing to suppliers of injured customers, licensors of injured licensees,
franchisors of injured franchisees, employers of injured employees, lessors of
injured lessees, and stockholders of injured corporations. MINNESOTA NOTE,
supra note 21, at 1016.
26. See, e.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th
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The Supreme Court, however, recently discouraged the use
of these tests and advocated a more flexible analysis of relevant
factors to determine whether a plaintiff has standing.2 9 These
factors include: the causal connection between the antitrust violation and the harm to plaintiff and whether that harm was
intended, the directness or indirectness of the injury and
whether the damages are speculative, the potential for duplicative or windfall recoveries, the existence of more direct victims
of the alleged violation, and the nature of the injury-whether
30
it is of the type the antitrust laws were designed to forestall.
This last standing factor identified by the Supreme Court
embodies the "antitrust injury" concept first articulated by the
Court in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.31 In
Cir. 1951), cert denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). In Loew's, the Ninth Circuit held
that a labor union and its members were not within the "target area" of an
alleged conspiracy between motion picture companies and another union. Id.
at 54-55. The court concluded that the plaintiff did not show that it was within
that area of the economy endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in the motion picture industry. Id.
27. See, e.g., Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
In Malamud, the Sixth Circuit granted standing to plaintiffs who alleged injury as a result of defendant's refusal to finance service stations. Plaintiffs alleged that this refusal reduced profits and inhibited expansion. The Sixth
Circuit granted standing to maintain an action for treble damages, holding that
the plaintiffs were "arguably ... within the zone of interests protected" by
the antitrust laws. Id. at 1152. The Supreme Court originally developed the
"zone of interests" test in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
28. See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H. S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982) (Ostrofe 1), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), initial decision adhered to on remand,
740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984) (Ostrofe II). In Ostrofe , the Ninth Circuit
granted § 4 standing to a discharged employee who refused to participate in a
price-fixing conspiracy, on the grounds that such standing would promote the
goals of the statute without creating any problems of windfall recoveries to
numerous or remote plaintiffs. Ostrofe I, 670 F.2d at 1384-86. The Supreme
Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ostrofe I and remanded for further consideration in light of its recent decision in Associated Gen. Contractors
of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). See
Ostrofe I, 460 U.S. at 1007. On remand, in Ostrofe I, the Ninth Circuit adhered to its initial determination on the standing issue. Ostrofe II, 740 F.2d at
748.
For other examples of the balancing test, see Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v.
Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581-87 (3d Cir. 1979); Bravman v. Basset
Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99-100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823
(1977); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 505-10
(3d Cir. 1976).
29. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-46 (1983).

30. See id.
31. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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Brunswick, the plaintiff, an operator of bowling centers in
three distinct markets, filed an antitrust action against a large
bowling equipment manufacturer that was also the largest operator of bowling centers in the country.32 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant's acquisition of four bowling centers which
had defaulted on equipment payments 33 violated section 7 of
the Clayton Act. Plaintiff sought treble damages under section
4. To establish damages, the plaintiff sought to prove that its
profits would have increased had the defendant not acquired
the defaulting centers but had instead allowed them to close on
34
their own.
In scrutinizing the Brunswick plaintiffs damage claim, the
Court stated that to recover section 4 treble damages, a plaintiff
must prove more than just a section 7 violation, which establishes only that injury may result. The Court required that the
plaintiff also prove that an injury did in fact result,35 that the
injury was causally related to the section 7 violation, 36 and that
the injury was "of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flowed from that which made defendant's acts

unlawful."

37

In Brunswick, the plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting from the defendant's preservation of competition.38 As
one commentator noted, "[t]he plaintiff in Brunswick formerly
32. The Court noted that the defendant Brunswick Corp. had acquired
222 bowling centers in the seven years before the trial of the case, making it
more than five times as large as the next largest competitor. The Court noted
also that petitioner nevertheless controlled only two percent of the bowling
centers in the United States. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 480.
33. Because of a decline in the bowling industry in the late 1960s, the defendant had experienced great difficulty in collecting money owed on equipment sales and had lapsed into "serious financial difficulty." Brunswick, 429
U.S. at 479. To meet this difficulty, the defendant began to acquire some of
the defaulting centers. Id. at 479-80.
34. Brunswick 429 U.S. at 481. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff
damages of $2,358,030, which the district court trebled. Id.
35. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 486. The Brunswick plaintiff contended that
the only additional element it needed to demonstrate was an injury in fact
caused by the violation. Id. The Third Circuit had agreed with this contention
and had found that the Brunswick plaintiff's damage claim satisfied this element. Id. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Id. at 486-89.
36. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488. The Court stated that any damage claim
must demonstrate more than a "causal link" to "the mere presence of a violator in the market." Id. According to the Court, a mere causal link requirement would enable a plaintiff to divorce antitrust recovery from the purposes
of the antitrust laws. See id. at 486-87.
37. Id. at 489.
38. Id. at 488.
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had a languishing, spiritless rival. After the merger it faced a
rejuvenated and aggressive competitor. Whether or not the
merger was illegal, the plaintiff's injury was caused by the postmerger firm's increased efficiency, not by the market's increased proclivity toward monopoly pricing." 39 Such a claim
could not succeed, the Court concluded, because the antitrust
laws "were enacted for the protection of competition, not
competitors."40

B. SECTION 16 INJUNCTION CASES AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF
BRUNSWICK
Unlike an action for damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, an action for an injunction under section 16 does not
require a private plaintiff to show actual injury to business or
property. 41 Many of the concerns arising from section 4 damage actions are inapplicable when a competitor seeks to enjoin
a purported section 7 violation. Notably absent are the treble
damage problems such as duplicative recovery and windfall
awards inherent in section 4 actions. 42 Courts in section 16
cases, therefore, have applied a less strict test for standing. The
plaintiff must allege a threatened antitrust injury which, in accordance with Brunswick, must be causally related to the alleged antitrust violation, and be of the type the antitrust laws
43
were designed to prevent.
Courts have used the Brunswick antitrust injury requirement to deny standing to plaintiffs in section 16 cases. Recently, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,44 the Tenth Circuit,
although not addressing specifically the question of antitrust
standing, affirmed a denial of plaintiff's request for preliminary
injunctive relief to block defendants' proposed acquisition be39. H. HOVENKAmp, supra note 1, § 14.5, at 374.
40. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). The policy result of this
holding in effect cuts § 7 away from the policy cord that generated it. See
supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 4. Because the injunction is supposed to protect against
threatened loss or damage from an antitrust violation, no actual damages need

be shown.
42. See Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct. 784 (1986) (No. 85-473); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Monfor 761 F.2d at 574; Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S.Ct.
1155 (1985).
44. 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,896, at 67,826 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 1984).
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cause plaintiff's allegations of general injuries flowing from the
anticompetitive effects of the merger were insufficient proof of
specific antitrust injury.4 5 Courts have also used the Brunswick antitrust injury requirement to deny standing to plaintiffs
in cases involving an attempt to block a hostile takeover, 46 a liquidation trustee's action against purchasers of corporate assets, 47 and a reporting agent's attempt to enjoin manufacturers
48
who chose to deal only directly with vendors.
Application of the Brunswick antitrust injury requirement
is appropriate to section 16 injunction cases based upon a putative section 7 violation. A primary concern in such a case is
that a competitor may attempt to use the procompetitive antitrust laws as a means to accomplish anticompetitive ends. 49 For
example, a company suing to vindicate its own private interests
may want to block a competitor's acquisition, despite Federal
Trade Commission or Justice Department approval of the
merger as consistent with the public interest, simply because
the challenging company fears it will not be able to match its
competitor's newly acquired efficiencies such as economies of
scale.50 Thus, the Brunswick scenario is not limited to section 4
damage actions. Private plaintiffs' incentives to enforce the antitrust provisions through an injunction may not be consistent
with the goals of those provisions. 51
45. Id. Pennzoil subsequently won a $10.2 billion state court judgment
against Texaco for wrongful interference with a planned merger of Pennzoil

and Gulf Oil Co. See What Texaco Owes Pennzoi4 N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1985,
at 26, col. 1.
46. See, e.g., Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainboldt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1186-87 (10th
Cir. 1983) (denying standing to an officer of a bank attempting to enjoin a hostile takeover by defendant under § 16 of the Clayton Act).
47. See, e.g., Turner v. Johnson & Johnson, 549 F. Supp. 807, 811 (D. Mass.
1982) (denying standing under both §§ 4 and 16 to trustees of a liquidating
trust who alleged fraud and misrepresentation as well as violation of federal
antitrust and state consumer protection laws on the part of defendants).
48. See Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205,
210 (3d Cir. 1980). In Schoenkopf, the court held that a reporter of information to cigarette vendors of manufacturer's price promotions lacked standing
to enjoin manufacturer's decision to deal only directly with the vendors. The
court stated that its "primary concern is that we have before us a plaintiff who
adequately represents the interests of the 'victims' of the antitrust violation,"
id. at 210, and held that the information reporter did not adequately represent
the small vendors. Id. at 211.
49. See Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 576 (10th Cir.
1985), cert granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986) (No. 85-473).
50. Id. at 576.
51. Private plaintiffs are generally not concerned with the social cost
or value of a particular practice. They sue in order to vindicate their
own private losses ....
If the antitrust laws are not to be grossly
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An analysis of the economic effects of horizontal mergers
illustrates this concern. Two consequences are exclusive to
horizontal mergers: the postmerger market has one less firm;
and the postmerger firm has a larger share of the market than
the original premerger firms.52 Horizontal mergers, therefore,
potentially cause one of two general types of injury. First, the
merger may facilitate monopolistic or collusive pricing by increasing concentration in the market.53 This injury falls on
consumers who then must pay higher prices; competitors, however, benefit by charging increased prices under the "umbrella"
of the postmerger firm.M
A second injury potentially caused by horizontal mergers
falls on market competitors because the merger may increase
the efficiency of the merged partners, who can then charge
lower prices.5 5 Mergers that increase efficiency can have significant procompetitive benefits, enabling a firm to acquire economies of scale and productive assets quickly and without
substantial costs.5 6 Under this alternative scenario, consumers
benefit but competitors are invariably injured5 7 because the
less-efficient competitors have higher costs and are therefore
unable to match the low prices of the merged firm. Prevailing
antitrust policy, however, is less concerned with protecting
rivals than with deterring
small business from more efficient
58
oligopolistic or collusive behavior.
The normal economic effects of horizontal mergers, then,
have two important ramifications for antitrust law. First,
courts should be wary when a competitor seeks to enjoin a horizontal merger between two of its competitors. Such a competitor is likely to sue when it fears the potential efficiencies and
increased competition that will result from the merger. A competitor is not likely to sue because of the resulting increased
overdeterrent, enforcement must be calculated to compensate for the
social costs of the defendant's acts, not to remedy private injuries
caused by increased efficiency.

H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 14.5, at 375-76.
52. Id,, § 11.1, at 293.
53. See id. § 14.5, at 373; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, §§ 61-62, at 116.
54. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 14.5, at 373.
55. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, 1 901, at 3; H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 14.5, at 373-74; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, § 204,
at 614-15.
56. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 11.1 at 293-94; see Missouri Portland
Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 859-60 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 16, § 204, at 614-15.
57. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 14.5, at 374.
58. Id. § 11.3, at 300; see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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market concentration from which it would benefit. Second, and
more important, a competitor seeking to enjoin a proposed horizontal merger between two other competitors cannot in most
circumstances satisfy the Brunswick antitrust injury requirement. The only plausible injury arising from a horizontal
merger that falls on a competitor results from the increased efficiency of the merged partners, which, under Brunswick, is not
an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. Four recent cases illustrate this problem.
II. ALLEGING THE IMPLAUSIBLE: MONFORT, WHITE,
CHRISTIAN SCHMIDT, AND CHRYSLER
In Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,5 9 Christian
Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co.,60 White Con-

solidated Industriesv. Whirlpool Corp.,61 and Chrysler Corp. v.
General Motors Corp.,62 each court acknowledged Brunswick's

"antitrust injury" requirement but incorrectly granted antitrust
standing by failing to scrutinize the alleged theories of injury
while instead concentrating on the plaintiffs' alleged theories of
violation. In examining the alleged injury, the courts either
looked beyond or failed to recognize the normal consequences
of a horizontal merger and its effects on industry competitors.
For example, in examining the alleged violation, the Tenth Circuit in Monfort and the Sixth Circuit in Christian Schmidt
failed to distinguish illegal predatory behavior from competitive
pricing. Moreover, the District Court for the District of Columbia in Chrysler ignored Clayton Act safeguards when it granted
standing to a competitor to enjoin a joint venture which was approved by the Federal Trade Commission.
A.

FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
HORIZONTAL MERGERS

In Monfort of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,63 the nation's
second largest beef packer, Excel Corporation, sought to acquire the industry's third largest beef packer, Spencer Beef.
59.

761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert granted 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986) (No.

85-473).
60.
61.

753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985).
612 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ohio), injunction vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022

(N.D. Ohio 1985).
62. 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984).
63. 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986) (No.
85-473).
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The nation's fifth largest beef packer, Monfort of Colorado,
Inc., sued to enjoin the acquisition. The Tenth Circuit found
that the increased concentration of economic power in the postmerger beef packing industry threatened competition and
therefore violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.6 This theory of
violation, however, presented the court with difficulties when
analyzed as a theory of antitrust injury. Increased market concentration normally benefits competitors. 65 The Tenth Circuit,
therefore, looked beyond the merger's immediate noninjurious
effects on competitors to potential injuries that would arise
66
from plaintiff's speculative claims of future illegal behavior.
The court noted that
[i]ndeed, Monfort would surely benefit if beef prices rose following
Excel's acquisition. Instead Monfort claims that Excel will be able to
engage in what we consider to be a form of predatory pricing in which
Excel will drive other companies out of the market by paying more to
its cattle suppliers and charging less for boxed beef that it sells to institutional buyers and consumers. The resulting cost-price squeeze
will, according to Monfort, reduce its profit margin and drive it and
other companies out of business. Once that occurs Excel will then use
its market power to charge monopoly prices for its beef. Thus, according to Monfort, the harm to competition will follow an intense,
but ersatz, period
of competition during which Excel will increase its
67
market share.

Finding that the "causal connection" between the section 7 violation and the alleged injury would exist "if Excel abuses its
market power" 68 through a cost-price squeeze on its competitors, the Tenth Circuit granted standing6 9 and approved a bootstrap antitrust injury theory based upon speculative behavior
by the defendants.
The Sixth Circuit in ChristianSchmidt Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co. 70 used similar reasoning to grant stand64. Id at 576-77.
65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

66. Monfor; 761 F.2d at 575.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 577-78.
70. 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985).
In ChristianSchmid4 the G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc. and H-P
Acquisition Corporation entered into an agreement to acquire the common
stock of the Pabst Brewing Company. Id at 1355. Heileman also entered into
a separate agreement that same day with another brewer, S & P Company, to
sell some of the Pabst assets for the purpose of avoiding possible antitrust objections by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Id. Shortly
thereafter, the Christian Schmidt Brewing Company and the Stroh Brewery
Company filed an antitrust suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, alleging various antitrust violations and seeking
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ing to plaintiffs, two regional brewers, seeking to enjoin the acquisition of one competitor by another larger brewer. The
court acknowledged that the plaintiffs would not have standing
if their alleged injury was merely the result of increased postmerger efficiencies. 71 The Sixth Circuit, however, looked beyond the normal effect of the merger to a more speculative
injury. Plaintiffs alleged that the economic power of the
merged corporations would induce distributors to drop them as
customers.72 Using a "lower threshold standing requirement"
for the section 16 case, the Sixth Circuit found that plaintiffs
had made a sufficient showing of potential or threatened antitrust injury to meet the customary requirements for a prelimi73
nary injunction and therefore had standing to sue.
Both the Monfort and Christian Schmidt courts allowed
the plaintiffs to allege an antitrust injury based on speculative
claims of "predatory" behavior by defendants. Predatory behavior traditionally refers to driving rivals out of business by
pricing below cost. 74 There is considerable debate over whether
this behavior actually occurs in practice. 75 Some commentators
argue that if a market is susceptible to monopolization and a
defendant is a dominant firm within that market, predatory
pricing may be plausible; others believe that predatory pricing
76
in any market is irrational and virtually never occurs.
declaratory and injunctive relief. Id The district court granted a preliminary
injunction on the grounds that the proposed merger would lessen competition
for malt beverages in the Upper Midwest market and that a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest. Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co., 600 F. Supp. 1326, 1328-30 (E.D. Mich.), affd, 753 F.2d
1354 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985).
71. Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d
1354, 1357 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985).
72. The Sixth Circuit found that this "more predatory and anticompetitive
consequence" might occur. Id. at 1357.
73. Id. at 1358.
74. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 6.7, at 172. Predatory pricing is considered under the antitrust laws as an illegal monopolization or an attempt to
monopolize, both of which violate § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982),
or possibly § 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982). H. HOVENKAMP, supra
note 1, § 6.7, at 172. Legal scholars generally agree that the dynamic of predatory behavior involves a trade-off of short-term losses during the predatory period for greater long-term gains during the postpredatory period of monopoly
power. See Hurwitz & Kovacic, JudicialAnalysis of Predation: the Emerging
Trends, 35 VAND. L. REv. 63, 67-70 (1982).
75. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
76. Whether predation exists is largely a function of a disagreement over
what, if anything, constitutes a barrier to entry in a market. For a discussion
of this disagreement, see Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra note 74, at 71. Some scholars believe that barriers to entry other than those based upon efficiency
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Although these scholars have suggested a variety of tests to detect predatory activity,7 7 most courts have used a cost-based test

to determine whether a defendant has engaged in predatory behavior. 78 Since 1975, however, when these tests came into
favor, very few plaintiffs have prevailed in predatory pricing acrarely, if ever, exist in any market. If this is true, it would be irrational for a
firm to engage in predatory behavior--any expected monopoly profits in the
future would provide targets of the predatory behavior with a strong incentive
to outlast the attack, and would always attract new competitors. See R. BORK,
supra note 16, at 314-20; Easterbrook, PredatoryStrategiesand Counterstrategies, 48 U. CmI. L. REV. 263, 267-72 (1981); McGee, PredatoryPricingRevisited,
23 J. L. & ECON. 289, 296 (1980). Other commentators argue that exploitable,
nonefficiency-based barriers to entry do exist. See, e.g., Williamson, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 647, 658 n.30 (1974) (prospective lenders, because of imperfect information, may perceive risks in loaning sums to a new market entrant
who faces a threat of predation). For views that a firm's reputation for predation in a given market may deter entry by other firms in that or other markets, see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTivE 185-87
(1976); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 560 (2d ed. 1980); Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly
Problem- Market FailureConsiderations,85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1522 (1977).
77. See, e.g., 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, 1 715b (proposing
short-term marginal cost or average variable cost as a floor for presumptive
legality); R. BORK, supra note 16, at 154 (no standard necessary on the grounds
that predatory pricing is irrational and virtually never happens); R. POSNER,
supra note 76, at 192 (suggesting long-term marginal costs as a floor for lawful
pricing); Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 336 (proposing that no standard is necessary on the grounds that predatory behavior is irrational and virtually never
happens); Scherer, PredatoryPricing and the Sherman Act. A Commen 89
HARV. L. REV. 869, 883-90 (1976) (advocating a full rule of reason analysis of
the facts of each case). For summaries of additional, more intricate proposals,
see Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra note 74, at 76-77 & nn.39-42.
78. Different courts have delineated three zones of predation analysis:
pricing at or above average total cost, which raises a conclusive presumption of
legality; pricing below marginal cost, which raises a rebuttable presumption of
illegality; and pricing at or above marginal cost but below average total cost,
which usually begets a "bounded rule of reason" standard. Hurwitz &
Kovacic, supra note 74, at 100-10. To determine the existence of predatory behavior under this standard, courts may consider additional factors such as the
defendant's intent and whether barriers to entry exist in the given market. Id.
at 108-10. For examples of these tests in the circuits, see Adjusters Replace-ACar, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884, 890-91 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 910 (1985); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724
F.2d 227, 231-35 (1st Cir. 1983); D.E. Rogers Assocs., Inc. v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1437 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3513 (1984);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1384-88 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1033-39 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615
F.2d 427, 431-34 (7th Cir. 1980); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. of Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
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tions.79 As a result, one commentator argues that courts should
dismiss all predatory pricing complaints when defendants are
competitors.8 0 Because plaintiffs rarely succeed in proving
predatory pricing,8 1 courts should be especially wary of such
claims made on a speculative basis.8 2
Ironically, the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio in White ConsolidatedIndustriesv. Whirlpool Corp.8 3 followed an opposite line of reasoning to grant the competitor79. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 6.7, at 172. For two rare cases in
which plaintiffs were successful in predatory pricing actions, see Sunshine
Books Ltd. v. Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1982); D & S Redi-Mix Co. v.
Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting Co., 692 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982). Two commentators came to the same conclusion after a study of 57 cases involving
predatory behavior. See Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra note 74, at 140-43.
80. See Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 331. Because predatory pricing
claims are so rarely successful in § 4 damage actions, a fortiori courts should
dismiss predatory pricing allegations in § 16 injuction cases.
81. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 6.7, at 172.
82. The Supreme Court has stated that speculative antitrust allegations
weigh against judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 545
(1983). The Court has also held that something more than the mere possibility
of an antitrust violation is necessary to sustain an action for injunctive relief.
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). In addition to White,
other lower courts have held that remote or speculative claims will not sustain
a cause of action. See Treasure Valley Photo Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida
Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203, 218 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974); General Fireproofing Co. v. Wyman, 444 F.2d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1971).
83. 612 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ohio), injunction vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022
(N.D. Ohio 1985).
In White, defendant Whirlpool Corporation, a manufacturer and distributor of a full line of major household appliances, entered into two stock
purchase agreements with co-defendants Dart & Kraft, Inc., a diversified food
and consumer products company, and Emerson Electric Company, a manufacturer, designer, and seller of many electrical and electronic products. Under
the terms of the Whirlpool-Dart & Kraft agreement, Hobart Corporation, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Dart & Kraft, would transfer all of its assets not
directly related to its KitchenAid division, a manufacturer and seller of dishwashers, to a separate corporation. Whirlpool would then purchase all the
stock of Hobart, known in its reconstituted form as KitchenAid. IM at 1013-14,
1018.
Under the terms of the Whirlpool-Emerson agreement, after acquiring
KitchenAid/Hobart from Dart & Kraft, Whirlpool would sell Traboh, a Hobart subsidiary which held the assets of two dishwasher manufacturing facilities, to Emerson. Id. at 1018. This latter agreement was made contingent upon
an additional supply agreement between Whirlpool and Emerson, under which
Whirlpool's acquired KitchenAid would buy all of its requirements for a certain dishwasher from Traboh for a period of eight years at a price calculated to
yield Traboh a net after-tax profit of twenty percent of its total operating capital in exchange for limitations on Emerson's marketing of its competing dishwashers. Id. The Whirlpool-Emerson stock purchases were intended by
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plaintiff standing to seek an injunction blocking the proposed
acquisition of KitchenAid by Whirlpool Corporation. In White,
the plaintiff-competitor alleged two theories of injury: increased market concentration 4 and a speculative scenario of a
postmerger market featuring abusive behavior such as predation, leverage, and collusion. 5 The White court rejected this
latter argument outright. Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Monfort
and the Sixth Circuit in ChristianSchmidt, the court found no
defendants to be a "curative divestiture," designed to eliminate possible antitrust problems. Id. at 1023.
Plaintiff White Consolidated Industries, a manufacturer and distributor of
a full line of major household appliances, filed an antitrust suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against Whirlpool, Dart
& Kraft, Hobart, and Emerson alleging, inter alia, that the proposed horizontal
acquisition of KitchenAid by Whirlpool violated § 7 of the Clayton Act and
other antitrust provisions. White sought to enjoin the acquisition under § 16 of
the Clayton Act. Id. at 1011-13. Plaintiff Magic Chef, Inc., a manufacturer and
distributor of household appliances under various brand names, filed a similar
complaint against the same defendants in the Southern Division of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Id. at 1012-13. The
cases were consolidated before the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio. Id. Plaintiffs then both moved for a preliminary injunction. Id. This
preliminary injunction was later vacated. See 619 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ohio
1985).
84. The plaintiff in White based this allegation on a statistical analysis of
the post-merger market, using Department of Justice merger guidelines.
White, 612 F. Supp. at 1019-22. For discussions of these guidelines, see generally id; H. HOVENKAmp, supra note 1, §§ 11.4-11.5, at 301-05.
The court found that the proposed transaction would violate the antitrust
laws despite Whirlpool's argument that the proposed transaction was procompetitive because it would revitalize the declining KitchenAid. White, 612 F.
Supp. at 1024-25. Whirlpool asserted that the curative divestiture absolved the
transaction of any antitrust problems. Id. at 1025.
The hearing on the motions for preliminary injunction was "somewhat extraordinary." Id. at 1012. Because all the parties had previously participated
in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission regarding the proposed
transaction, see infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text, the arguments on
both sides were the result of extensive preparation. White, 612 F. Supp. at
1012. Judge Krenzler described it as "tantamount to a hearing on the merits."
Id.
The court found that the market-share statistical analysis set forth by the
plaintiffs created a prima facie illegal transaction. Id. at 1032. Moreover, the
court found the curative divestiture defective because of the restrictions placed
upon Emerson in the Whirlpool-Emerson supply agreement. Id. The court
found "that the transaction would increase Whirlpool's ability to restrict output and raise prices, an ability which, over time, would increase further.
Given the current state of the dishwasher market ... such an ability [was]
likely to substantially reduce competition." Id. Finding that the plaintiffs had
made a sufficient showing of potential or threatened antitrust injury to meet
the customary requirements for a preliminary injunction, the court granted
standing. Id.
85. White, 612 F. Supp. at 1019.
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evidence to show that the defendant Whirlpool had engaged, or
was likely to engage in the speculative abusive practices.8 6 In
short, it refused to allow a "bootstrap" antitrust injury
argument.
The White court, however, granted the plaintiffs standing
87
on the basis of increased postmerger market concentration.
In doing so, the court failed to recognize one of the horizontal
merger's normal economic consequences: increased postmerger
market concentration benefits competitors.8 8 Increased postmerger market concentration may threaten competition and violate section 7 of the Clayton Act by fostering collusion among
industry competitors who can charge higher prices.8 9 Such action would injure consumers, 90 but as the Supreme Court stated
in Brunswick, a private litigant must allege more than just a
section 7 violation: the litigant must allege that it has suffered
an antitrustinjury causally linked to the section 7 violation. 91
Because a competitor is normally a beneficiary of increased
92
market concentration, a competitor cannot allege such injury.
In granting standing to plaintiffs on the basis of increased postmerger market concentration, the White court failed to distinguish between the plaintiff's plausible section 7 violation theory
and the plaintiff's implausible section 16 injury theory.
The District Court for the District of Columbia in Chrysler
Corp. v. General Motors Corp. 93 also failed to scrutinize the
86. Id. at 1031.
87. Id. at 1030-32.
88. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 53.
91. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
92. Consumers, forced to pay the higher prices that result from the increased postmerger market concentration, would be able to allege this theory
of injury. In addition, suppliers, who may be forced to accept lower prices for
their goods as a result of collusion among industry customers, could also plausibly allege this theory of injury.
93. 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984).
In Chrysler, defendants General Motors Corporation, the world's largest
automobile company, and Toyota Motor Corporation, the world's third largest
automobile company, proposed a joint venture to manufacture and market in
the United States a subcompact automobile derived from an existing Toyota
model, the Toyota Corolla. Id. at 1184. The Federal Trade Commission scrutinized and approved a modified joint venture plan as consistent with the antitrust laws. Id. Plaintiff Chrysler Corporation, however, brought an antitrust
action to enjoin the proposed joint venture, alleging that it violated §§ 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 1184-87.
The District Court noted its concern over the sharing of price information
between General Motors and Toyota. Id. at 1193. Two reviewing Federal
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plaintiff's allegations of injury in granting standing to enjoin a
joint venture between two competitors. Like the White court,
the Chrysler court granted standing on the basis of decreased
competition,94 which might harm consumers and suppliers but
would only benefit competitors. Each of the eight theories of
injury alleged by Chrysler either harmed consumers but benefited Chrysler, harmed Chrysler but benefited competition, or
was too speculative.9 5
Five of Chrysler's theories of injury alleged harm to consumers and competition but not to Chrysler. Chrysler's claim
that the joint venture would destroy existing competition between General Motors and Toyota in the design and manufacture of subcompact automobiles 96 alleged potential harm to
consumers, not Chrysler. The practical result of this allegation-the elimination of one competitor in the postmerger market-means less product variety for consumers. One less
subcompact competing with Chrysler's own models, however,
benefits Chrysler.

Chrysler's claim that the proposed venture would lessen
price competition between General Motors and Toyota9 7 also al-

leged potential harm to consumers but not to Chrysler. Collusive pricing benefits competitors in a concentrated market by
allowing them to raise their own prices under the "umbrella"
of other competitors. 98 Chrysler's claim that the decreased
price competition between General Motors and Toyota would
also reduce price competition among the other manufacturers 99

again alleged harm to consumers but not to Chrysler. Reduced
price competition can only mean increased prices for Chrysler.
Chrysler's claim that the venture would provide Toyota
with a disincentive to begin its own manufacturing operations
in the United States' 00 similarly alleged potential harm to consumers but none for Chrysler. One less competitor in the
American manufacturing industry would most likely mean less
competition for Chrysler. Although consumers may be injured,
Trade Commission members had dissented from the approval of the venture
on these grounds. See 48 Fed. Reg. 57,246, 57,252-57 (1983) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 13).
94. Chrysler, 589 F. Supp. at 1193; see infra note 109 and accompanying
text.
95. Chrysler, 589 F. Supp. at 1189-90.
96. Id. at 1189.

97. Id.
98. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
99. Chrysler,589 F. Supp. at 1189.

100. Id.
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the decreased competition would benefit rather than injure
Chrysler. Finally, Chrysler's claim that the joint venture "is
likely to foster mergers, acquisitions, or joint venture relationships involving other major automobile companies"' L again alleged only increased market concentration, which would
02
potentially harm consumers but only benefit competitors.
Two of Chrysler's theories of injury alleged potential harm
to Chrysler, but not of the type the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent. Chrysler's claim that other American
manufacturers will be induced to rely on importing Japanese
subcompacts instead of manufacturing their own models, "resulting in a surrender of the market to a handful of Japanese
manufacturers,' 10 3 is deceptive. It is difficult to determine
how such a scenario, if plausible, would reduce competition or
harm Chrysler. Moreover, the antitrust laws are not concerned
with the origin of products for sale to the American public. 0 4
In addition, Chrysler's claim that the venture will enable General Motors to market a subcompact model auto without making the capital investment necessary for other American
manufacturers to develop a similar model 0 5 complains only of
increased efficiency and more vigorous competition. The antitrust laws are not concerned with mergers that create more efficient competitors. 0 6 Chrysler, therefore, could not properly
allege antitrust injury on this basis.
Chrysler's last claim, that the venture will require General
Motors and Toyota to share information about pricing, marketing, and product development and thereby reduce competition
between those two manufacturers and enable them to direct
their competitive efforts at Chrysler, 0 7 is not threatening in
light of the government's oversight of the venture. 0 8
101. Id at 1190.
102. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
103. Chrysler,589 F. Supp. at 1189.
104. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, 523(b)(6), at 362-63
(suggesting that foreign imports should not be treated differently than domestic output when defining markets in antitrust cases); see also United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945) (Although Alcoa was
the sole producer of virgin ingot in the United States, the court computed Alcoa's market share by including in the defined market the total amount of imported ingot sold in the United States.). For a discussion of Alcoa and the
relationship between national and international markets in antitrust law, see
L. SULIVAN, supra note 16, § 20, at 70-72.
105. Chrysler,589 F. Supp. at 1189-90.
106. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
107. Chrysler,589 F. Supp. at 1190.
108. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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In spite of these allegations, the court granted standing to
Chrysler because it could not conclude that "on the record
before it ... Chrysler would not be entitled to recover for the

decreased competition between defendants which will it alleges
result from the joint venture."'109 The court thus allowed
Chrysler to sue on the basis of decreased competition, a scenario that would only benefit Chrysler.
In granting standing to the plaintiff in Chrysler, the district
court also ignored Clayton Act provisions providing for government oversight of horizontal mergers and joint ventures. The
1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Amendments to the Clayton Act require companies to notify the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Justice of all proposed mergers and acquisitions.'1 0 Congress designed the amendments to allow the government to make more informed decisions in its role as
enforcer of the antitrust laws and increase its ability to obtain
injunctive relief pending suit under those laws.1 1'
This oversight authority protects the public from antitrust problems that
may arise in the future.112
After careful scrutiny, the Federal Trade Commission approved the proposed joint venture between General Motors and
Toyota under this amendment. 113 The FTC, in fact, concluded
that the General Motors-Toyota joint venture would have significant procompetitive benefits to the American public.1 14 De109. Chrysler,589 F. Supp. at 1193.
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
111. The House Committee on the Judiciary Report stated that the measure would
strengthen the enforcement of Section 7 by giving the government antitrust agencies a fair and reasonable opportunity to detect and investigate large mergers of questionable legality before they are
consummated. The government will thus have a meaningful chance
to win a premerger injunction-which is often the only effective and
realistic remedy against large, illegal mergers-before the assets,
technology, and management of the merging firms are hopelessly and
irreversibly scrambled together ....
See H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ai. NEws 2637, 2637. If the government finds a proposed merger repugnant to competition in a particular industry, it may elect to sue the defendants under the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
112. United States v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 652 F.2d 72, 106
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
113. Chrysler,589 F. Supp. at 1184. The FTC scrutinized the proposal for
more than a year. I& at 1184 n.1.
114. 48 Fed. Reg. 57,314 (1983) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 13). The FTC
determined that the merger could provide four significant procompetitive benefits: that the venture would increase the number of small cars available in
America and thereby allow consumers a wider range of choices among models;
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spite the FTC's approval, the Chrysler court granted plaintiff
standing to enjoin the joint venture. FTC approval of a proposed joint venture should command a court to engage in careful scrutiny of a competitor-challenger's claims for clear
antitrust injury' z1 5 Enforcement of the antitrust laws is primarily the responsibility of the government."16 Absent a showing of clear error by the FTC, a court should defer to the
antitrust determinations of that administrative agency.
B.

FAILING TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PREDATORY AND
COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR

In granting standing based on speculative allegations of illegal postmerger behavior, the courts in Monfort and Christian
Schmidt failed to distinguish predatory from competitive behavior. Competition is lawful; predation, which reduces competition, is unlawful. 1 7 It is important, then, to recognize the
distinction between increased competition and predatory behavior when considering the allegations of competitors seeking to
enjoin horizontal activity among other competitors."38 The
that the venture car would cost less to produce than if General Motors had to
rely immediately on other alternatives; that the venture would allow General
Motors to complete its learning of more efficient Japanese manufacturing
techniques; and that the venture would give General Motors and ultimately
the rest of the American auto industry an opportunity to increase its longterm productive efficiency. Id. at 57,314-16. Two FTC Commissioners dissented. Id. at 57,246, 57,252-57.
115. Courts should decline to assess the wisdom of the government's judgment concerning the public interest under the antitrust laws. See Sam Fox
Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961).
116. United States v. Borden, 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954) ("[I]t is the Attorney
General and the United States district attorneys who are primarily charged by
Congress with the duty of protecting public interest under [antitrust] laws.").
As commentators have stated: "Notwithstanding the increasing volume of private antitrust suits, government-initiated actions are the key to enforcement of
the antitrust laws. They are undertaken in the public interest, addressed to
more significant restraints, and backed by substantial resources." 2 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, supra note 10, 327, at 131.
117. See Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. of Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d
790, 797 (10th Cir.) (Prices above average variable cost and above marginal cost
indicate "rational, competitive behavior."), cert denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977);
Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 926 (10th Cir.) (IBM's price reductions
found to be "ordinary marketing methods available to all in the market," not a
use of monopoly power), cert denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
118. For examples of authorities that have noted this distinction, see supra
note 53; see also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231
(1st Cir. 1983); Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Ac 88 HARV. L. REv. 697, 732-33 (1975) (dis-
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courts in Monfort and ChristianSchmidt failed to make this
distinction.
The plaintiff in Monfort did not allege that the defendant
would engage in predatory pricing. 119 The cost-price squeeze
referred to by the court in Monfort, then, would presumably be
caused by the defendant paying more to suppliers and charging
less to customers, thereby reducing profit margins.120 Such a
cost-price squeeze, however, does not meet the pricing-belowcost definition of predatory behavior.-2 ' On the contrary, logic
and sense indicate that this behavior is efficient pricing and
competitive. Pricing as close to costs as possible in an effort to
increase market share is a common business goal and is beneficial to consumers.
Similarly, in ChristianSchmidt, the speculative behavior of
the distributors, who would allegedly drop the smaller plaintiffs ahd deal only with larger companies in the market, fails to
fit within traditional notions of predatory behavior. There is
nothing "predatory" in a distributor's decision to distribute certain brands at the exclusion of others if it feels that it would be
more economically feasible to do so. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged this. 2 2 If a distributor did in fact drop the smaller
brewers, it is difficult to see why it would do so for any reason
other than that it would be economically feasible.
In sum, speculative claims of predatory behavior cannot
provide a basis for standing in section 16 injunction cases; such
claims only allow plaintiffs to circumvent the Brunswick antitrust injury requirement.
CONCLUSION
The Brunswick antitrust injury requirement represents
the crucial element of a court's determination of standing in
both section 4 and section 16 antitrust actions because it pretinguishing between competitive and predatory pricing by examining the relationship between a firm's costs and its prices).

119. Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 683, 691 (D.Colo.
1983), qf'd, 761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), cert granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986)
(No. 85-473).
120. See supra text accompanying note 67.
121. The Tenth Circuit uses a cost-based standard to determine predatory
behavior. See Pacific Eng'g, 551 F.2d at 797 (suggesting that in the absence of
other evidence, a cost-based test can best determine whether conduct is anticompetitive); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
122. Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d
1354, 1357 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1155 (1985).
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vents private plaintiffs from seeking to remedy injuries caused
by increased efficiency. Courts have recognized the need to apply the Brunswick requirement to section 16 cases. 123 In addition, section 16 of the Clayton Act links injunctive relief to
"threatened loss or damage."'1 24 These words suggest that an
antitrust injury requirement is incorporated into section 16.12
The courts in Monfort, ChristianSchmidt, White, and Chrysler,
however, failed to correctly apply the Brunswick requirement.
Each court failed to recognize that a competitor who seeks to
enjoin a horizontal merger or joint venture between two of its
competitors cannot allege a plausible theory of antitrust injury.
Adherence to the Brunswick antitrust injury requirement
in section 16 cases would still sanction private actions by suppliers and consumers who could plausibly allege an antitrust injury, and would still allow actions by the government suing in
the public interest. Competitors seeking to block horizontal
mergers and joint ventures of other competitors, however, are
not appropriate plaintiffs and should not have standing to enforce the antitrust laws.
John F. Hartmann

123.
124.
125.
fers, 80

See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
See Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender OfMICH. L. REV. 1155, 1165-66 (1982).

